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This paper reports on a three-part investigation into people’s perceptions of cybersecurity,
based on their lived experiences. We sought thereby to reveal issues located within the Johari
grid’s “Blind Spot” quadrant. We utilized research methodologies from both the Arts and
Science in order firstly to identify blind spot issues, and secondly to explore their dimensions.
Our investigation confirmed a number of aspects that we were indeed aware of, when it came
to people’s lived cybersecurity experiences. We also identified one particular blind spot issue:
widespread, but not universal, negativity towards cybersecurity. We then carried out an
investigation using a recognized methodology from psychology, as a first attempt to assess
the nature of this negativity and to get a sense of its roots. What our initial experiment
revealed was that scoping cybersecurity-related emotions is nontrivial and will require the
formulation of new measurement tools. We conclude by reporting on the challenges, to
inform researchers who plan to extend the research reported in this paper.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00746-5 OPEN
1 University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK. 2 Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. 3 Abertay University, Dundee, UK. 4 Technische Universität
Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany. ✉email: karen.renaud@strath.ac.uk; zimmermann@psychologie.tu-darmstadt.de










The current day and age is characterized by a widespreadpersonal ownership of Internet connected devices(BusinessLine, 2019). This means that most of society now
also has to contend with the risk arising from the efforts of a
global population of cyber criminals, potentially targeting their
devices (Vojinovic, 2019; Eid, 2019). Governments are respond-
ing by developing national cybersecurity strategies (US
Government, 2018; Her Majesty’s Government, 2016; Australian
Government, 2016; Public Safety Canada, 2018), organizations
are establishing cybersecurity divisions (Vavra, 2019), and uni-
versities are funding cybersecurity research (UEU Commission,
2019).
The everyday end users of Internet-enabled devices and ser-
vices, who vastly outnumber security experts and researchers, are
most closely engaged with cybersecurity. Their voices can be
drowned out in the general clamour of voices speaking about
cybersecurity. When the end users’ voices are heard, their
responses are usually constrained by specific questions that are
formulated by the major stakeholders in the field. Yet, it is
important to consider the end users’ unprompted perspectives,
opinions, and perceptions of cybersecurity, so that the social
desirability bias does not influence their responses.
Human-centred security researchers study and improve the
interface where humans and security-related technologies meet.
Their usual research philosophy is positivist (Crotty, 1998), i.e.
revealing general laws of behaviours and highlighting causal
relationships within the research space. As such, the researchers
and experts choose the research topics, formulate the research
questions, develop studies and design experiments. These
researchers are investigating important and crucial aspects of
human-centred security, and their solutions make a huge differ-
ence to the field as a whole.
Yet, there are additional ways to carry out research: different
philosophies that can be used to reveal unexpected and unanti-
cipated dimensions of a research field. These approaches can
uncover the meanings everyday computer users construct, instead
of testing pre-formulated hypotheses.
Saunders et al. (2016) explain that a purely positivist approach
(i.e. hypothesis-led) does not afford a rich and nuanced view of
reality, and does not reveal differences in individual experiences.
Moreover, it seeks to explain and predict, but not to interpret
phenomena (Walsham, 1995).
The interpretivist approach, on the other hand, focuses on the
meanings people attribute to specific phenomena. Crotty (1998)
argues that people cannot be studied the way physical phenomena
can be studied because people construct meaning, and it is these
divergent, idiosyncratic and emergent meanings that the inter-
pretivist philosophy seeks to uncover.
Due to our desire to understand how people experience
cybersecurity aspects of their world, by considering people’s
“lived” experiences, embracing an interpretivist philosophy
seemed a viable choice for our initial foray. We hoped to explore
how the man and woman in the street feels about cybersecurity as
a phenomenon. In particular, what puzzles them, what questions
they would like to ask (but perhaps do not ask), and what they
want researchers to ask them. In essence, we wanted to hear them
describe the perceptions they formed based on their lived
experiences of cybersecurity.
We planned to use these alternatives to reveal cybersecurity-
related issues situated in the upper right quadrant of a version of
the Johari window adapted to information needs (Luft and
Ingham, 1961; Shenton, 2007) (Fig. 1), i.e. the aspects we, as
researchers, are not yet aware of or perhaps only vaguely suspect
the existence of. Along these lines, Hand (2020) writes about
‘Dark Data’: missing data that we might not even know is
missing. The fact that we do not know it is missing means that we
do not act to remedy the issues the data would have revealed. The
missing data is essentially a Blind Spot. Similar to the blind spots
in your eyes, you can reveal what is hidden by changing your
perspective. This is what we sought to achieve.
To carry out our investigation, we appropriated techniques
from the Arts, following up with more traditional scientific
techniques to ensure that the research approach was rigorous.
We thus crafted a portfolio methodology, blending inter-
pretivist and positivist approaches in order first to identify
cybersecurity constructed meanings and responses. Then, we
can switch to a positivist approach, to investigate the identified
issues using tried and tested techniques from the field of
psychology.
Such a portfolio methodology is essentially a departure from
our usual purely quantitative and positivist approaches used to
embrace a more flexible, open-ended and nuanced investigation.
Our research serves multiple purposes:
a. we show the meanings people construct related to
cybersecurity, in terms of content, affect and emotion,
b. we derive a hypothesis to inform future human-centred
research, i.e. People experience negative emotions when
confronted with cybersecurity-related terms,
c. having formulated the hypothesis, we deploy an appropriate
methodology from the field of psychology to test it, and
d. we outline our “portfolio” research methodology and
propose it as an alternative way to carry out this kind of
exploratory research, combining interpretivist and positivist
approaches to explore constructed meanings in the
cybersecurity domain.
We commence by outlining our research methodology (section
“Research methodology”). The subsequent sections describe each
of the steps in our research methodology, concluding in the
section “Outcome and reflection”, which reflects, details the
limitations of our study, and discusses the challenges of future
work. Section “Conclusions, future work and implications”
concludes.
Research methodology
The aim of this research project was to explore a relatively
neglected area: end users’ actual perceptions based on their lived
experiences of cybersecurity. All perceptions, even that of
cybersecurity, contain some affective reaction (Zajonc, 1980).
Consider, for example, a flower: it is often not merely a flower,
but rather a fragrant flower, a beautiful flower, or a symbolic one.
Psychological research has shown that perceptions influence
people’s attitudes towards a topic, their motivation and perceived
ability to deal with a certain topic, and finally their behaviour in
terms of this topic (Bagozzi et al., 2000). Hence, perceptions of,
and emotions related to, cybersecurity might be an important
factor influencing cybersecurity attitudes and behaviours. To
carry out this research, we constructed an interdisciplinary
approach, using a portfolio of methodologies from cybersecurity,
psychology and arts. The structure of the portfolio approach is
depicted in Fig. 2.
Study 1: Affect valence (Section 3—EARNEST): We needed a
very simple tool to capture cybersecurity affective responses, one
that was both simple to use and obviously afforded anonymity
(Fig. 3). We called the tool EARNEST: affEct RespoNse mEa-
Surement Tool. EARNEST allows people to consider a particular
question (which is easily replaced). In this case, we are using it to
assess how people respond to the question “When I think about
cybersecurity:”. They indicated the response affect on a scale
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ranging from “very sad” to “very happy” by inserting a plastic
counter into the appropriate cylinder. The cylinders are deliber-
ately opaque so that people would not be influenced by others’
choices. We specifically did not “man” EARNEST so that people
would feel free to express their genuine feelings when choosing a
cylinder to deposit their plastic disc into.
Study 2: Free text responses (Section 4—RETELL): We wanted
to collect richer data than that afforded by EARNEST. The
instrument we chose was an old-fashioned typewriter. This
allowed people freely to express their feelings in terms of cyber-
security. This approach was based on a project conceptualized by
artist Sheryl Oring (2018). Her project: “I wish to say” launched in
Oakland, California in 2004. She created a portable public office
using a manual typewriter and invited people to dictate postcards,
which would be typed and sent to the president of the United
States, so that their voices would be heard. To date, more than
3200 postcards have been typed during the course of the project
and have been sent to the White House (Torpedo Factory Art
Center, 2017). We call this measurement tool RETELL: fREe Text
rEsponse coLLector. The beauty of RETELL lies in its affordances.
In the first place, the relatively slow typing speed and the absence
of an ‘undo’ button encourages considered reflection about what
they really want to say. The second is that it is clearly “offline”.
This assures people that they are truly anonymous and
encourages frank and honest responses. Finally, using a type-
writer is sufficiently novel to attract respondents who want to play
with a device from a bygone era.
We commenced with a pilot study to help us to refine the
experimental set up (section “Pilot study”). We then launched the
actual study in two European countries, eliciting responses from a
wide range of respondents in different contexts (section “Main
study”). We did not aim to reveal cross-cultural or cross-country
differences but rather wanted to collect responses from a wide
range of respondents due to the nature of this research as being
exploratory. We report on our findings in the section “Discussion
and reflection”. It is important to mention that we did not collect
any demographic information as we would normally do in sci-
entific studies. We did this deliberately, to ensure that people
Fig. 1 A Johari window adapted from Shenton (2007). It maps users’ knowledge to researchers’ knowledge of issues.
Fig. 2 The paper’s research methodology is depicted in this flow diagram.
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knew they could express their real emotions without being con-
cerned about social desirability or the risk of being judged for a
less than positive reaction to cybersecurity.
Formulate hypotheses (section “Hypotheses”): We reflected on
the findings from Study 2, and categorized the identified aspects
in terms of whether they were ARENA or BLIND SPOT issues
(Fig. 1). This is the point at which the research transitions from
an interpretivist to a positivist philosophy to reveal the dimen-
sions of the identified blind spot issues. To test the affect-related
hypothesis, we could not use surveys or interviews because such
self-report tools might not accurately reflect people’s affective
responses to cybersecurity aspects. We thus appropriated an
innovative technique from psychology that did not rely on self-
report.
Study 3: Push/Pull (Section “Study 3: Push/Pull Study”): Solarz
(1960) carried out an experiment that relied on so-called eva-
luative reactions (approaching, avoiding, reaching for, pushing
away, etc.) in order to detect people’s positivity or negativity
towards a particular concept. We appropriated this method to test
the hypothesis. Specifically, we showed participants terms coming
from four different word categories: (1) positive, (2) neutral, (3)
negative, and (4) cybersecurity. We asked them to operate a
commercially available joystick and either pull a term towards
them, indicating positive valence, or to push a term away from
them, indicating negative valence. We were interested in the
extent of cybersecurity-related terms receiving positive or nega-
tive evaluations and their positioning, as compared to other, non-
cybersecurity-related word categories.
Outcome (section “Outcome and reflection”): Having carried
out the portfolio research, this section brings everything together
to draw final conclusions and reflect on the value of the portfolio
approach, our findings, and the implications thereof.
Study 1: EARNEST—simple affect assessment
To investigate cybersecurity emotions, pictures of sad and happy
faces were attached to EARNEST’s cylinders to reflect different
affective responses (see Fig. 3). The pictures were taken from the
pleasure scale of “SAM”—the Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley
and Lang, 1994), that has been shown to be a suitable tool for
measuring affect, can be used with children and adults, and is
culture-free and language-free (Morris, 1995), which suited our
data collection in two different European countries. The five
affect states range from “very sad” to “very happy”. The partici-
pant’s task was to put a plastic counter into the cylinder which
best reflected their personal cybersecurity affective response. We
positioned EARNEST in a number of settings, and left it there for
up to 2 weeks before moving it to a new location. The locations
included the lobby of our university, a coffee shop in a city centre,
Chambers of Commerce meetings, the public library and uni-
versity events. We tallied the number of counters in each cylinder,
and positioned EARNEST in a different location.
Measurements: We counted the number of plastic coins in the
cylinders corresponding to affect valence in response to the dis-
played question on EARNEST.
We combined the negative and positive tallies to report coar-
sely grained affect valence categories: negative, neutral and
positive (Russell, 1980).
Outcome: Figure 4 shows the final tallies. The outcome is
indeterminate. The negative responses outnumber the positive
and neutral responses, but the differences are not compelling. The
results, while interesting, left us with the realization that
responses to cybersecurity cannot be captured meaningfully on a
sad–happy scale, but are likely to vary, in terms of context, per-
sonal and cybersecurity-related action dimensions. To dig deeper,
we explored cybersecurity perceptions in Study 2.
Study 2: RETELL—free text responses
Pilot study. The pilot study took place on the grounds of our
university in a publicly accessible building. For a couple of weeks
Fig. 3 The EARNEST: affEct RespoNse mEaSurement Tool based on Bradley and Lang (1994), with obfuscated images on cylinders from Morris
(1995). People choose a cylinder based on their emotional state and deposit a plastic coin in a slot at the top.
Fig. 4 Study 1’s tallied ranking collected by the EARNEST measurement
instrument (Negative, Neutral, Positive).
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we set up a stall with posters to catch the attention of passersby,
general study information, a typewriter (Brand Olympia), and a
box for collecting the typed sheets (see Fig. 51). Furthermore we
provided emoji stickers to give participants the opportunity to
express their emotions related to cybersecurity graphically, along
with their typed responses. To ensure that we did not frame their
responses, the instruction was phrased as “Cybersecurity—We
want you to have your say” and “Cybersecurity—I just want to
say...” on the posters (see Fig. 61). During the first few days,
interested parties expressed the need for more information, so we
added further instructions on how to use a typewriter and pasted
the instruction “Please type what you would like to say about
cybersecurity” on the typewriter itself.
Participants could type as much as they liked, or abort at any
time, by simply discarding their partial response. We did not ask
for any personal information to assure anonymity and to
encourage frank and honest responses. The sample consisted of
people who passed by our stall and participated voluntarily. As
soon as they were done, participants were asked to drop the typed
sheet in the box. By so doing, they agreed to participate in
the study.
The required steps were illustrated on the posters as well as on
the corresponding artefacts, i.e. the typewriter and the collection
box (see Fig. 5). The stall was unsupervised, but regularly
monitored. The researchers’ contact details were provided on the
posters so that we could answer questions or deal with typewriter-
related problems when alerted.
Results and implications for the main study. The pilot study
served the purpose of deriving an initial code book to afford
categorization during the subsequent study, as well as inform-
ing improvements to the main study design. A total of 43
responses (i.e. sheets of paper) were submitted. Please note that
the number does not necessarily align with the number of
participants as participants could easily provide multiple
responses. Seventeen sheets were excluded because they did not
contain study-related information but rather jokes, slogans or
indecipherable text.
The analysis was based on Mayring’s inductive content analysis
(Mayring, 2004). Typed texts were analysed on two independent
code axes: (1) content-wise and (2) in terms of the emotional-
affective level of each statement. After the development of an
initial code book by one of the authors, all responses were coded
by two authors independently. Inconclusive assignments were
resolved by means of discussion, and supplementation of the
categories, where necessary. A typed text and sentences within the
text could be assigned several codes due to the parallel coding in
terms of content and affective-emotional level. The content-wise
categorization included what the person stated or how they
understood cybersecurity, and the affective-emotional level how
Fig. 5 The pilot study setup with the typewriter, posters and yellow box for people to submit their typewritten sheets.
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they felt about the concept. The content-wise categorization
covered perceived causes, problems, consequences and suggested
measures in terms of cybersecurity. The affective-emotional
categorization covered the form of the statement (e.g. question,
opinion) and the emotion (e.g. anger, fear, happiness) associated
with cybersecurity.
We derived the following refinements for the main study:
● The participants considered the typewriter a good idea and
fun to use. For some, the typewriter even initiated the
participation in the study. However, some participants
requested further instructions on how to use the typewriter.
We produced a manual for the main study.
● As a second point, the participants asked for additional
information on the study itself and for specific questions to
respond to. We thus designed a flyer containing additional
study information and provided a selection of incomplete
sentences that participants could choose from to complete. To
do so, we made use of the different kinds of statements, i.e.
questions, opinions, statements and emotions, that we identified
in the pilot study to incorporate the participants’ inputs instead
of our own research questions. We derived six open-ended
sentences such as, “In terms of cybersecurity, I feel...”. The
complete list can be found in the section “Main study”.
● We realized that we had to be be present at the stall during
the main study to help people struggling with the typewriter
and to answer participants’ questions directly. With these last
two measures we also hoped to reduce the number of
nonsense and off-topic responses.
Main study. The main study used a similar setting to the pilot
study with revised and more detailed posters, instructions and
information (see Fig. 7). The stall was mobile and set up in
different locations in two European cities: at public fairs and
exhibitions of varying content, in canteens, in foyers of publicly
Fig. 6 The attention-catching and instruction posters used in the pilot study, translated to English from German.
Fig. 7 Anonymized versions of the attention-catching and instruction posters used in the main study. Images used on the posters were from www.
pixabay.com.
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accessible university buildings, cafés, and libraries. Participants
ranged from young to older adults, including students,
employed and retired people. We did not collect any demo-
graphic information to ensure that participants were assured of
full anonymity. The participants were able to choose any of six
sheets with different incomplete sentences to prompt a
response. The task was to complete the sentence in their own
words, with the possibility to add whatever and how much they
wanted. The incomplete sentences were derived from the
categorization of the pilot study (see the section “Results and
implications for the main study”):
1. encourage expression of emotion:
(a) “When I think about cybersecurity I feel...”
(b) “when someone mentions about cybersecurity, it makes me
feel...”
2. personal opinion: “My opinion on cybersecurity is that...”
3. suggesting a measure or improvement: “In terms of
cybersecurity, my suggestion would be that...”
4. ask a question: “What I always wanted to ask about
cybersecurity is...”
5. a general statement similar to the pilot study’s instructions:
“In terms of cybersecurity, I justwant to say...”
The participants were encouraged to use the typewriter, but in
case of problems or uncertainty, they could dictate a text to the
experimenter or write their statement by hand to be typed by the
experimenter to ensure that anonymity was preserved (Fig. 8).
Results. For the analysis of the typewriter responses, the code
book derived from the pilot study results was used, but extended
with new categories that had not been mentioned in the pilot
study. Thus, a deductive-inductive approach was followed. Again,
all responses were coded in terms of content and affective-
emotional level of statement.
Participants could submit as many responses as they liked, each
of which could lead to several codes, due to the parallel coding in
terms of content and affective-emotional level of statement.
Altogether N= 215 responses were collected, including those
gathered during the pilot study. Of these 51 were collected in
Scotland and 164 in Germany. For the purposes of this
publications, all quotes were translated to English.
A total of 61 times, the sheet with the incomplete sentence to
express an opinion was chosen. The sheet encouraging a statement
was chosen 31 times, the two sheets targeting emotions 48 times,
and the sheet encouraging a question 17 times. A total of 32 times,
the participants chose to complete the suggestion sentence. The 26
eligible responses from the pilot study were not assigned due to the
later introduction of the open-ended sentences.
Content-wise categorization. A total of N= 420 codes were
assigned in terms of content. The categories concerning content
were allocated to the main categories
● “Causes and Problems”, i.e. What are the cybersecurity
problems people perceive?, What or whom do they deem
responsible for the problems?
● “Effects and Consequences”, i.e. What effects are produced by
the perceived cybersecurity problems? What are the con-
sequences of current cybersecurity developments?
● “Suggested Measures”, i.e. What do people suggest to solve
cybersecurity issues? What do people wish for in terms of
cybersecurity?
The category “Causes and Problems” was the category with the
highest number of codes with a total of N= 216. This category
has been divided into six subcategories. For a complete overview,
including category descriptions and exemplary codes for each
subcategory, see Table 3 in Appendix A.
The subcategory “Lack of Knowledge & Significance” received
the highest number of codes (n= 114). On the one hand, many
participants acknowledged cybersecurity as an important topic in
general. On the other hand, many participants stated that people
lacked knowledge, did not consider the topic important enough
and that cybersecurity had too little significance in society. Some
Fig. 8 The RETELL stall, with three manual typewriters on the back table, with the banners left and right to attract attention. Images used on the
posters were from www.pixabay.com.
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participants also mentioned that people neglected the topic out of
aversion or ignorance. An exemplary quote including several
aspects is
“Most people ignoring this topic. It overstrains them and
they lack the time to deal with the topic, furthermore they
lack knowledge and they do not know how and where they
can get infos about the topic” (Response R8).
The second most common subcategory was “Responsible
Entities” (n= 70) in which the people or organizations that were
deemed responsible for cybersecurity problems, were coded. The
participants mentioned different responsible groups or entities
like hackers, companies, countries or politics, respectively, but
also individuals and even themselves. Exemplary quotes are
“[...] data-hungry companies such as Facebook or Google.”
(R53) or “Despite this, users’ lack of security awareness very
often is the biggest problem” (R10).
The subcategory “Security Vulnerabilities” consisted of n= 22
codes. Several security issues, such as viruses and Trojans, various
technical deficiencies or rapid technological development were
mentioned. An exemplary quote is
“My opinion on cybersecurity is that the development of AI
will undermine cybersecurity efforts” (R83).
The subcategories “Term Cybersecurity” (n= 3), “Financing/
Costs” (n= 3) and “Counter-productive Behaviour” (n= 4)
received only a few mentions. “Term Cybersecurity” includes
texts in which people expressed the idea that the term was chosen
poorly. “Financing/Costs” describes cybersecurity financing
issues. “Counter-productive Behaviour” encompasses cases in
which cybersecurity has been neglected or deliberately reduced to
achieve certain purposes. An exemplary quote is
“In terms of cybersecurity, my suggestion would be that one
stops trying to weaken IT security to implement non-
functioning local policies” (R28).
An overview of the category “Effects and Consequences”
(n= 80) including category descriptions and exemplary quotes
for each subcategory is shown in Table 3.
The subcategory “Societal Damage” (n= 45) deals with texts
that describe damage to infrastructure, national institutions,
businesses and harm for individuals as a result of attacks or poor
cybersecurity.
“I fear that contact data will be stolen or hacked” (R3).
“Lack of protection/Insecurity” (n= 28) includes texts from
people who no longer feel protected, describe security as an illusion,
and express a clear desire for more security. Examples would be
“Cybersecurity is a illusion” (R39) or “Every system is
vulnerable to a specific type of attack” (R143).
An exemplary code for “Cybersecurity as a field of work and
study” (n= 7) is:
“Cybersecurity is a great field on which securing a business
depends [...] Cybersecurity plays an important role in the
security of a business and in the growth of the business”
(R107).
For the category “Measures and Suggestions” n= 121 codes
were assigned. For a complete overview including category
descriptions and exemplary quotes see Table 3. The subcategory
“Education & Communication” (n= 53) includes topics such as
making use of expert knowledge, educating, communicating
information, building trust, or improving collaboration.
“More education about the risks of disclosing personal
information should be provided. Especially the digital
natives should get an understanding of how to generate
secure passwords and how to protect themselves on the
Internet” (R119) or “The topic should be much more open
and much more talked about, or taught” (R174).
Improvements in user-friendliness, software and technology
were mentioned and requested in the sub category “Technological
Protection & Support” (n= 36).
“It [Cybersecurity] should work without you knowing that
it is there. It should protect people and their
information” (R92).
The subcategory “Laws & Politics” (n= 17) contains suggested
legal regulations and political measures.
“Politics should finally come to terms concerning the topic
realistically and with a clear vision of the future” (R171).
“Personal Security Behaviour” (n= 15) includes texts which
suggest secure user behaviour on the Internet.
“We should all give less of our data and change the attitude
in society” (R145).
Categorization in terms of affective level of statement. The
“affective level of statement” categorization describes how the
participants formulated their responses and what emotions
were expressed. In total, n= 350 codes were assigned. The
codes were subdivided into the categories “Statements/Opi-
nions”, “Suggestions”, “Questions” and “Emotions/Affective
Level”, whereby the “Emotions/Affective Level” category was
divided into positive, negative, and neutral feelings and
emotions.
A total of n= 168 codes were assigned to “Statements &
Opinions”: This category comprises all responses that include a
personal statement (i.e. “That’s the way it is”) or a personal
opinion (i.e. “I think...”, “In my opinion...”). For example:
“In terms of cybersecurity, I just wanted to say that I find it
shocking how little attention we give to it” (R145).
Suggestions were made in n= 75 cases. This category included
responses in the form of “One should...”.
“For mobile devices, there should be more information”
(R100).
Questions, i.e. every response that was formulated as a
question, were asked n= 32 times, e.g.:
“How easy is it really to hack web cams?” (R141)
In “Affective level/Emotions”, most emotions were negative
(n= 57). Only n= 14 responses were positive, and n= 4 neutral
codes could be assigned. A negative code would be:
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“When I think about cybersecurity, I feel confused and
depressed” (R37).
An example of a positive code would be:
“When I think about cybersecurity, I feel secure” (R70).
Discussion and reflection. Figure 9 provides an overview of
identified issues. We now discuss them in detail.
ARENA issues. Our study confirmed a number of issues known to
both researchers and users (Fig. 1):
● Lack of awareness/knowledge: People spoke about a perceived
lack of awareness and cybersecurity-related knowledge.
Specifically, people felt that educational institutions, such as
schools, should deliver more cyber education. Examples for
research pursuing similar goals include the use of games to
increase the users’ motivation to learn about cybersecurity
issues (Jin et al., 2018), attempts to generate knowledge and
competencies through competition (White et al., 2010), or
awareness-raising programmes (Vroom and von Solms, 2002;
Susanto and Almunawar, 2012).
● Uncertainty: The participants expressed uncertainty and
feelings of a lack of security. They wanted to know exactly
how they ought to behave and how they could protect
themselves. This suggests that people want actionable and
concrete, rather than general, cybersecurity-related informa-
tion. Moreover, cybersecurity research showed that actionable
information is more effective in enhancing security-related
behaviours compared to general information or pointing out
potential negative consequences without providing advice for
avoiding these (Witte, 1992; Renaud and Dupuis, 2019).
● Cyber attack harm: They also mentioned the societal damage
and harm resulting from cyber attacks as acknowledged in
many cybersecurity reports (Widup et al., 2018; Cisco, 2018;
Symantec Corporation, 2018).
● Shared responsibility: It is noteworthy that participants not
only acknowledged the importance of cybersecurity, but
also their own role in assuring cybersecurity. Most often
the participants viewed themselves or other individuals as
being responsible for cybersecurity or the lack thereof. In
the literature, the role of the end user in terms of
cybersecurity has been ambiguous. While some researchers
view end users as a vulnerability or weakest link (Wood and
Banks, 1993; Schneier, 2011; Kraemer and Carayon, 2007),
other more recent approaches emphasize the end users’
ability to be a contributor to cybersecurity and
acknowledge the shared responsibility of all actors to
ensure cybersecurity (Sasse et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2018;
Hollnagel et al., 2006; Zimmermann and Renaud, 2019).
Because the statements in our study were often framed
negatively, the participants’ views seemed to align more
with the “human-as-problem” view.
● Need for law enforcement: Other actors were mentioned
several times: the state or politics in general. People called for
tighter legal frameworks in the form of data protection laws to
address the actions of cyber criminals. An analysis of 19
national cybersecurity strategies (Luiijf et al., 2013) revealed
unclear relationships between national cybersecurity strategies
and national or international policies in many cases,
confirming this. Further, even though the need for society-
wide approaches is acknowledged, actions aimed at citizens
are often limited to awareness and education campaigns.
Thus, some researchers call for better support of citizens by
means of law enforcement and tighter regulation (Bauer and
Van Eeten, 2009; Renaud and Flowerday, 2018).
● Usability-security trade-off: Some mentioned a conflict
between usability and security, arguing for an improvement
in usability of security tools. This conflict has often been
mentioned by researchers in various areas such as encryp-
tion (Whitten and Tygar, 1999), smart home technologies
(Zimmermann et al., 2019) or password creation (Inglesant
and Sasse, 2010) and is targeted, especially by usable
security researchers that aim to lessen the trade-off by
increasing usability of security technologies and considering
human needs (Adams and Sasse, 1999, Zurko, 2005).
Attempts include password meters to support usable and
secure password creation (Ur, 2017), the development of
usable privacy management tools (Gerber et al., 2017), or
the design of interfaces to increase the security and usability
of e-voting (Marky et al., 2018) or authentication (Lashkari
et al., 2009).
BLIND SPOT issues. In terms of the emotional-affective coding of
the responses, we observed that participants mentioned negative
emotions four times as often as positive emotions, when talking
about cybersecurity. Feelings of insecurity and uncertainty were
mentioned more often than any other. Cybersecurity was
described as difficult and complex. People also felt anxious,
overwhelmed, or angry, when it came to cybersecurity.
There are an increasing number of interventions available to
people, and educational measures, tools and information are all
freely available (see the section “ARENA issues”). Our
participants wanted better security, but did not know what
actual cybersecurity measures to take. This uncertainty had a
negative valence.
A potential explanation for this gap is suggested by the
emotional-affective categorization of the participants’ responses.
It is possible that part of the problem lies neither in unmotivated
users nor in a lack of information, but in the feelings of insecurity,
uncertainty, frustration and mental overload experienced by
participants. Even so, this mostly negative profile of expressed
feelings does seem to be something that cybersecurity researchers
have not paid much attention to, as yet.
Research from psychology and related disciplines has shown
that affect and emotion play an important role in terms of
people’s attitudes towards a topic, their motivation and perceived
ability to deal with it, and finally their subsequent behaviours
(Bagozzi et al., 2000). This is likely to apply to the cybersecurity
field too. If users feel uncertain about which information or
advice to follow, out of the plethora of available advice, or if they
feel overwhelmed by the amount of information, this might
Fig. 9 Referring back to Fig. 1, the issues we identified during study 2 are
situated within the applicable quadrants of the Johari window.
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negatively influence their engagement with cybersecurity issues.
The same might happen if they feel insecure due to negative
media reports, negative personal experiences or cybersecurity-
related fear appeals (Dupuis and Renaud, 2020).
Psychological models describing such negative influences
include the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) model
proposed by Liang and Xue (2009) and the two-process theory of
Mowrer and Lamoreaux (1942). The approaches suggest that
people with cybersecurity-related fears, or people who connect a
topic with stress and frustration based on previous conditioning,
will not engage constructively with a topic, but rather avoid it or
even refrain from using new technologies.
In terms of cybersecurity education and skills, a number of
psychological theories include affect and emotion as an important
factor for learning and understanding new issues: It influences
acceptance of new topics and the perceived ability to solve a
problem. According to Bandura (1997), who is well known for his
work on self-efficacy expectancy, the extent to which one is
confident, in terms of ability, has an impact on the actual
performance. His findings have also been applied to
human–computer interaction: For example, Compeau et al.
(1999) investigated the self-efficacy expectancy and expected
outcome of using a computer. The investigation showed that
desirable and undesirable attributions are important antecedents to
computer self-efficacy. It is likely that cybersecurity self-efficacy
plays an equally crucial role in triggering secure behaviours.
In terms of carrying out desired cybersecurity-related beha-
viours, the theory of planned behaviour according to Ajzen
(1991) explains how attitude towards a behaviour, control
expectation, and social norms are important to initiate a desired
behaviour. Uncertainty and aversion towards a topic may thus be
counter-productive. For example, a study by Bulgurcu et al.
(2010) showed that an employee’s intention to comply with the
organization’s information security policy was influenced by their
attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy.
In conclusion, a number of theories that have been successfully
applied to human–computer interaction indicate that affect and
emotion impact whether and how people engage with new topics,
their mastery of new topics, and finally acceptance and actual
security-related behaviours. In the next sections, we will thus
explore user perceptions of cybersecurity in more detail.
Hypothesis. Based on our identification of negative emotional
responses to cybersecurity as a blind spot issue, we now transi-
tioned to a more positivist and traditional scientific approach. We
propose the following hypothesis for subsequent investigation:
H1: People experience negative emotions when confronted
with cybersecurity-related terms.
Study 3: Push/Pull Study
We wanted to determine the type and magnitude of underlying
psychological responses to cybersecurity precautionary terms.
Doing so would help us to determine whether these terms are
perceived positively or negatively. We benefited from Solarz’s
(1960) study design, and used it to determine whether partici-
pants’ first responses would be to draw the term towards them
(PULL), or try to push it away, i.e. rejecting the concept (PUSH),
using a standard issue joystick.
Theoretical background. This test relies on the psychological
theory of motivation. Research into the approach–avoidance con-
flict (Lewin, 1936; Miller, 1944) established a link between the
perception of desirable and undesirable outcomes of a given action,
on the one hand, and corresponding approach or avoidance
behaviour, on the other. Inversely, observing an approaching
behaviour by an individual may allow us to infer the individual’s
perception of desirable outcomes. Inexperienced users confronted
with cybersecurity-related topics may perceive undesirable out-
comes of this confrontation, choosing to avoid them. We aim to
investigate the extent to which users show approach or avoidance
behaviour towards cybersecurity-related concepts.
Materials. This experiment required us to display words of dif-
ferent valence, and then to monitor push or pull actions and the
valence thereof. We used the original lists of positive, negative
and neutral words from Frings et al. (2010) (Table 2 in the
Appendix).
To arrive at a list of cybersecurity-related words, we carried out
a crowd-sourced survey to determine which security precautions
people were aware of, and generally used. We consulted https://
www.cybrary.it/glossary/to obtain the list. We then gave people
two lists: (1) which precautions had they heard of, and (2) which
precautions they used regularly. We launched the job with 100
respondents on the online platform CrowdFlower. Table 1 in the
Appendix shows the results, demonstrating the usage of the
precautions amongst the CrowdFlower participants. We used the
top 15 most popular precautions in our study.
Finally, we composed a set of neutral, positive and negative
words for the learning stage of the experiment as follows (the
responses to these words were not measured or recorded during
the learning phase).
Neutral thick book, small city, blue globe, fountain pen and
green bottle.
Positive christmas gift, hearty laugh, very tasty, so beautiful and
go on a picnic.
Negative powerful hate, lose money, hit and run, painful knee
and crash and burn.
Method. Participants were asked to operate a commercially avail-
able joystick device while being shown words from four categories:
positive, neutral, negative, and words related to cybersecurity con-
cepts. The words were displayed in random order.
Measurements included the direction of the joystick operation
(towards one’s body or away from one’s body), the time required
to initialize the operation after a word was presented, and the
time required to complete the movement and return to the
neutral position.
Sample. The targeted sample size for this study was specified via
an a priori power analysis (Cohen, 2013) using G*Power (Faul
et al., 2007). Assuming a medium sized effect, an alpha level of
0.05, and a power-level of 0.95, 55 participants were required. A
total of 61 participants were recruited to compensate for potential
outlier removals. Participants were recruited in part as a con-
venience sample without compensation, while students enroled in
psychology were compensated with course credit. 44 participants
were German native speakers, two were English native speakers,
and 15 participants indicated “other” as their native language. All
were fluent English speakers. 45 participants were currently
enroled as students, with 17 of them being psychology majors.
Eleven participants reported being employed in full-time con-
tracts while five participants reported being self-employed. Two
participants were excluded from further analysis due to their
reaction times in the subsequent task lying outside of the 5th and
95th percentile of data (Ratcliff, 1993). The remaining data
consisted of 59 participants (68% female, age mean= 26.83 years,
standard deviation= 9.23 years).
Procedure. After welcoming a participant to the experiment room,
they were seated in front of a computer screen and a joystick on a
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desk (Fig. 10). They were asked to give consent concerning the
purpose of the study, as well as the data analysis and data
retention details after being informed about them in writing. The
experimenter then informed the participant about the directional
response task and operation of the joystick while instructing them
to react as quickly as possible to presented words. Once the
participant indicated that they had no more questions about the
task, they were presented with a number of learning trials. Sub-
sequently, the main directional response task began. Moving the
joystick towards the participant’s body was considered a positive
reaction toward a presented stimulus, while moving it away from
one’s body was considered a negative reaction.
All participants saw four total categories: positive, neutral,
negative, and words related to cybersecurity concepts (see Fig. 11)
in randomized order, controlling for sequence effects. Measure-
ments included the maximum extent of the joystick operation
towards one’s body or away from one’s body (intensity), the time
required to initialize the operation after a word was presented
(reaction time), and the time required to complete the movement
and return to the neutral position (movement time).
Results. On average, positive, negative, neutral and cybersecurity-
related words received 95%, 11%, 75% and 65% positive reactions,
respectively. After checking for statistical assumptions, we con-
ducted a Friedman’s ANOVA (Field et al., 2012) to investigate
differences in the directional intensity of joystick movements
between stimulus categories. The ANOVA revealed significant
differences between the groups with Chi2(3)= 124.74, p < 0.001.
Pairwise comparisons using Wilcoxon signed rank tests revealed
significant differences for all category combinations. This means
that movement intensity significantly differed between neutral
and negative (V= 1722, p < 0.001, r= 0.81), neutral and positive
(V= 54.5, p < 0.001, r= 0.66), neutral and cybersecurity-related
(V= 1173.5, p < 0.01, r= 0.36), negative and positive (V= 10,
p < 0.001, r= 0.84), negative and cybersecurity-related (V= 22,
p < 0.001, r= 0.83), and positive and cybersecurity-related word
categories (V= 1559.5, p < 0.001, r= 0.75). The median move-
ment intensities per stimulus category were 0.60 (neutral), −1.00
(negative), 1.00 (positive), and 0.33 (cybersecurity-related), with
−1 indicating a full push away from the participant and +1
indicating a full pull towards the participant. Movements were
counted after crossing an initial intensity threshold of 0.3 in either
direction. Thereafter, the maximum movement intensity reached,
before returning to a neutral position, was considered for the
analysis presented here.
To investigate differences in reaction times between stimulus
categories, we first checked whether the data satisfied the
necessary statistical assumptions. After finding assumptions for
parametric procedures violated, we conducted a nonparametric
Friedman’s ANOVA (Field et al., 2012) for repeated measures.
Results show a significant difference between the four stimulus
categories Chi2(3)= 106.02, p < 0.001. We consequently com-
pared the cybersecurity stimulus category against each other
category in a set of planned comparisons via Wilcoxon signed
rank tests to determine its reaction time position relative to the
other groups. The cybersecurity stimulus category shows a
significantly higher reaction time compared to neutral stimuli
(V= 80, p < 0.001, r= 0.77), negative stimuli (V= 206, p < 0.001,
r= 0.66), and positive stimuli (V= 4, p < 0.001, r= 0.83).
Aside from reaction times required to initiate an action in the
experiment, we also investigated movement times required to
complete the action once it had been initiated. A Friedman’s
ANOVA revealed significant differences in movement times
between stimulus categories Chi2(3)= 9.10, p= 0.028. However,
no pairwise comparisons between stimulus categories turned out
to show significant differences by themselves.
Figure 11 shows the average movement intensity for each
cybersecurity-related term. It is interesting to note that the two
terms that were pushed away, “encrypt devices” and “use
password manager”, are those that are not widely adopted
(Renaud and Zimmermann, 2019; Sheng et al., 2006). This
suggests that familiarity, and perhaps consequent uncertainty,
might have played a role in eliciting negativity in this case.
Discussion. We observed a clear difference in tendencies to push
or pull the words when it came to negative, neutral or positive
Fig. 10 A depiction of the Push/Pull study. On the left, a photograph of one of the researchers sitting in front of the test computer. On the right is a
graphical depiction of the push/pull study setup.
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words. Positive words were generally pulled towards the partici-
pants, negative words pushed away, and neutral words elicited a
generally positive response. Meanwhile, the median response
towards cybersecurity words was variable. Consequently, we
conclude that participants did not have distinctly avoidance-type
reactions towards cybersecurity words, but, on average, slightly
approached terms, as reflected in Fig. 11. As such, we cannot
support Hypothesis H1. A post-hoc approach to categorizing
cybersecurity words did not yield a clearer picture of the data, as
cybersecurity words with similar movement directions do not
seem to be similar in terms of their implied content.
Yet the RETELL study had revealed widespread negativity when
we asked people what they wanted to say about cybersecurity. We
now consider why RETELL and Push/Pull findings were different.
We did note that the reaction times to the cybersecurity
words were significantly longer than reactions to all the other
words while movement times were not different. One possible
explanation is provided by word length in that the cybersecurity
terms were often lengthier than the other words included in the
study and thus took longer to process and react to. Another
possible explanation for this could be that cybersecurity-related
words were less cognitively available to participants, increasing
cognitive processing time before an action could be initiated. It
might be that the reaction to cybersecurity was not an
automated but a reflective one, as compared to the other
common terms included in the study. In contrast, people might
already have “learned” an association with the other words, so
they could react more quickly and “automatically”. This
indicates that availability needs to be controlled in order to
draw conclusions about valence based on participant reaction
times. However, we expect subsequent investigation of the
effect of availability on reaction times towards cybersecurity
words to resemble general research on word recognition
(Moreno and van Orden, 2001). This means that availability
may lead to nonlinear, methodologically challenging effects on
reaction times in word recognition.
Hence, we have to conclude that this particular tool probably
did not have the power to scope the negative emotions that
emerged in the RETELL study. It was clearly more complicated
than we initially thought it was going to be.
Outcome and reflection
Our research portfolio approach combined arts and scientific
research technologies. The former was used to satisfy the inter-
pretivist approach, with traditional psychological methodologies
being used to satisfy the more positivist approach.
The interpretivist stage was inspired by Sheryl Oring’s art-
based approach to encourage participants to freely and anon-
ymously express their thoughts on cybersecurity via a typewriter
(Oring, 2018). We analysed both content and affective-emotional
aspects of statements. The pilot study helped us to tailor our
RETELL setup for maximum efficacy in terms of measuring
people’s responses to cybersecurity as a topic.
Future research in this direction could consider setting up
RETELL in locations that can reach a wider variety of
respondents, e.g. shopping centers and public places. The
typewriter is a great way to gain attention with many wanting to
“play” with it. However, the operation should be simplified for
those struggling, e.g. by having someone type for the partici-
pants similar to Sheryl Oring’s (2018) approach. The approach
of eliciting emotional responses was well received by the par-
ticipants and many descriptions were provided. Overall, the
deployment of this tool was a wise choice.
The Push/Pull test was specifically chosen to test the affect-
related hypothesis that emerged from Study 2 and utilize
response variables common in psychological investigations of
cognitive phenomena. Participants appeared to understand the
response variables of reaction times and reaction intensities
well and no clarifying questions concerning their meaning were
posed. Methodologically, we conclude that the push/pull
paradigm was generally appropriate for the task at hand.
However, cognitive psychology provides similar experimental
paradigms that may be more suitable for measuring emotion in
this context. We propose that go/no-go tasks (Gomez et al.,
2007) or emotional stroop tasks (Frings et al., 2010) be trialled
to determine whether they can provide insights into partici-
pants’ reactions to specific cybersecurity-related terms.
Limitations. EARNEST attempted to elicit a gut-feel affect
response, but did not really give us any helpful information
Fig. 11 The barplot depicting movement directions for the displayed cybersecurity-related terms.
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about the source of the emotion. In retrospect, the tool was a
poor measurement tool for this study, both in itself, and in the
situations within which it was deployed. In the first place, the
question posed on EARNEST was arguably far too much of an
umbrella term, and too general to elicit meaningful responses.
In the second place, we situated it in busy areas where people
would pass by, hoping that many would choose to put a counter
in one of the slots. However, this very busyness of the contexts
would have made it difficult for people accurately to provide an
immediate gut-feel response, and the reason they were passing
by might have been more important to them than participating
in the study.
The RETELL exploratory study was much better at giving
people the opportunity to provide their thoughts, suggestions
and questions. Yet the generalizability of the sample might be
limited due to the sample probably being mostly young and
educated. The stall was set up in different places and events, but
mostly in university buildings or their surroundings due to the
legal challenges of operating a stall in public venues. So, even
though all venues were publicly accessible, most entries probably
came from a pool of people with an academic background but
due to the focus on anonymity, we cannot describe the sample
further. Future approaches of this kind should seek to reach a
larger audience, setting up the stall in public places such as
shopping centers, parks, stations, libraries or museums, to
recruit a more diverse sample.
The Push/Pull test could benefit from enhanced data gathering
and experimental design. Additional background information,
such as previous exposure to cybersecurity-related threats, could
shine light on the general approach-type reactions observed for
many of the cybersecurity words. As mentioned in the discussion,
a post-hoc categorization approach of cybersecurity words failed,
but a careful selection of words to match previously defined
categories might alleviate this issue.
Challenges and future work. It is challenging to measure emo-
tion without changing it (Bradley and Lang, 1994) because, as
Bradley and Lang explain, emotions are part of the human
response repertoire. Kassam and Mendes (2013, p. 1) explain that
“The awareness and conscious assessment required by self-report
of emotion may significantly alter emotional processes”.
Given Schneirla’s (1959) argument that approach-avoidance
motivation is deeply embedded in our natures (Schneirla, 1959),
further confirmed by (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990), we appro-
priated a tool that exploited this to measure cybersecurity-related
emotions. The tool failed to detect any significant across-the-
board negative emotions.
A number of explanations can be advanced for this:
(1) Elliot and Thrash (2010) argue that the strength of
approach and avoidance tendencies are personality dependent.
Our tool did not factor in personality differences, which might be
moderating factors.
(2) Cybersecurity is very new in humanity’s evolutionary
history. Unlike many other security-related concepts, cyber-
security is barely decades old. That means people are not as au
fait with the cybersecurity-related terms. This might have
impacted response times by requiring people to engage
reflective cognitive processing, instead of tapping into
their immediate responsive processing, the two systems of
information processing suggested by Dual Process Theories
(Kahneman, 2011).
Our initial expectation of cybersecurity-related words being
evaluated as quickly and intensely as negative words was not
met, possibly because reaction time in the Push/Pull task is
affected by more complex psychological processes than we
initially anticipated.
(3) Cybersecurity has two dimensions related to actions to be
taken by individuals: the prevention dimension (actions to take
to resist attacks) and the recovery dimension (actions taken to
respond to and recover from a successful attack). People may
feel positive about the first but negative about the second. All of
the words in our Push/Pull word list were precautionary actions
but in the RETELL study we did not specify the actions. We
used cybersecurity as an umbrella term. This might explain the
difference between the two studies’ findings.
(4) Cybersecurity terms, as a whole, might well be infused by
the fear and dread of being attacked, in addition to the uncertainty
of what precautions to take, and not knowing how to implement
them. The Push/Pull study did not include any element of
uncertainty or fear and so did not tap into these emotions.
We also mentioned the possible role of availability, familiarity
and potentially increased cognitive processing required to
respond to cybersecurity terms. We deliberately chose the most
popular mechanisms, but some might admittedly still not have
been particularly familiar to the participants.
We have posited a number of explanations for the failure of
our empirical study to confirm the findings of the first study.
Future research ought therefore to explore emotional responses
towards cybersecurity via less availability-dependent measures
and also accommodate the controlled effect of availability on
reaction time for emotionally-relevant stimuli.
Conclusions, future work and implications
We set out to uncover blind spots that we, as cybersecurity
researchers, were unaware of. We deployed an exploratory
methodology borrowed from the arts to gather insights that
were not prompted, framed or triggered, which they would
have been if we had applied a traditional positivist approach.
What we discovered was that the majority of our respondents
felt negatively towards cybersecurity, and expressed these
negative emotions when we gave them the opportunity to do so
in an unprompted fashion. Yet, this trend could not be con-
firmed in a follow-up study which aimed to analyse the finding
in more detail.
Our paper makes two contributions: (1) we revealed a pre-
viously undetected cybersecurity “blind spot” issue: the fact that
mention of cybersecurity might well elicit negative emotions; (2)
we conclude that traditional psychological tests for measuring
emotional responses via words are probably not suitable for
measuring emotions in the cybersecurity context.
Detecting the presence of this negativity is merely the first step.
The next step is to discern its nature. As future work, it would also
be of benefit to uncover the factors contributing to the negative
emotions people experience with respect to cybersecurity. In our
limitations section, we have already highlighted the need to find
more innovative and rigorous ways of measuring these negative
emotions in such a way that we do not influence them by
measuring them.
The implications of this research are that those who deliver
cybersecurity training should be cognisant of the fact that the
concepts they are introducing might well trigger negative emotions.
They ought to take specific measures to be sensitive to this, and to
take the time to explain the terms clearly and carefully to ensure
that unfamiliarity does not lead to uncertainty and negativity.
Appendix
See Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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Table 2 Frings words (Frings et al., 2010).
Negative Neutral Positive
PANIK panic STILLE silence GEDULD patience
MORD murder DAUER period FEIER celebration
ANGST fear WINTER winter ALEE boulevard
AUFPRALL crash STUHL chair TRAUM dream
VERRAT betrayal ZUSTAND condition BEGABUNG talent
AERGER annoyance QUADRANT square IDEE idea
ANGRIFF attack PAPIER paper WIESE meadow
LAWINE snowslide FORMAT format GARTEN garden
UNGLUECK misfortune ECKE corner STRAND beach
GEISEL hostage STRUKTUR structure CHANCE opportunity
TEUFEL devil FLASCHE bottle VERSTAND understanding
LUEGE lie MONAT month WAHRHEIT truth
PRUEFUNG exam BRETT board GESCHENK gift
FOLTER torture WOLLE wool GENUSS enjoyment
GEWALT violence EPOCHE era BLUETE blossom
HASS hate WINKEL angle FANTASIE fantasy
UNFALL accident BEGRIFF concept HUMOR humour
TUMOR tumour BEISPIEL example SPASS fun
Note: German words in uppercase, English words in lowercase.
Table 1 Testing awareness and usage of precautions.
Use Aware of
Encrypt Devices 7 37
Cover WebCam 11 23
Use Password Manager 17 46
Use VPN (Virtual Private Network) 22 62
Logoff Websites 28 46
Browse Anonymously 32 65
Make Backups 37 68
Use Firewall 43 73
Security Updates 46 70
Anti-Malware Software 49 73
Change Passwords 52 65
Secure WiFi 55 66
Anti-Virus Software 71 80
Lock Screen 73 81
Strong Passwords 83 83
Table 3 Overview of the content-wise categories and examples for codes included in the categories (#= number of codes).
Sub Category Example #
Perceived causes and problems
Lack of knowledge and significance 114
Lack of knowledge “I also have the feeling to lack the basis to comprehensively understand the topic.“ (R151) 27
Topic is considered important “Everyone should be well informed, because it is becoming increasingly important.” (R118) 31
Lack of significance in society “This is a serious issue that everyone should be concerned with. Too often this topic is taken lightly.” (R18) 26
Difficulty/complexity “Cybersecurity is a big and complex topic.” (R121) 12
Lack of security awareness “Nothing in life is safe. However, in cyber many people are less aware of this.” (R128) 10
Lack of interest/ignorance “My opinion on cybersecurity is that it is underestimated and not taken seriously. Too many ignore the
topic, especially in terms of politics and not computer scientists.” (R172)
8
Responsible entities 70
People/individuals “My opinion on cybersecurity is that it is severely neglected by most people.” (R179) 29
Hacker/attacks “I am afraid that contact data will be stolen or hacked.” (R3) 18
Organizations “People should pay more attention to cybersecurity. Companies do too little to protect their business and
their customers.” (R27)
14
Politicians/countries “Most of all, however, I do not think the political will to adopt or implement useful and effective measures
or laws.” (R8)
9
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Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current
study are not publicly available due to the fact that many personal
details are embedded in the data.
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